BRICS has invited six new members to join the group. This article explores the history of the group's name and the possibilities regarding a name change. 

The recently concluded BRICS Summit in Johannesburg has created waves in the world of geopolitics, international economics and multilateral diplomacy. The final day of the summit, 24th August, saw the release of the 

 during a joint press conference of BRICS leaders led by the host, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. He was also accompanied by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The declaration contained 94 points, most of which were about reaffirming the goals and commitments of the group as well as procedural updates. Yet, one sentence, point 91 in particular, has been the main talking point amongst scholars and enthusiasts of international relations ever since. It mentions that BRICS has decided to invite six countries to join the group as full members from 2024. This includes Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. There have been several discussions about the significance and implications of the move on international monetary policy, geopolitics, changing power dynamics, etc. However, the question that has intrigued analysts and bystanders alike, is what will happen to the name of the grouping?

Leaders at the XV BRICS Summit in Johannesburg - August 2023

BRICS is an acronym made up of the first letter of all members of the grouping - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The name of the group holds significant importance. In fact, in the case of BRICS, the name came much before the idea of the grouping ever existed. In 2001, British economist 

”, describing four rapidly growing economies that he predicted would dominate the world economy by 2050. Informal meetings between the foreign ministers of these countries started in 2006, and a more formal grouping was only formed in 2009, eight years after the name was coined. In 2010, South Africa was accepted as a full member, giving the group its current name. 

British economist Jim O’Neill who coined the term “BRIC” in 2001

The success of the term comes from its resemblance to the English word ‘bricks’, which is defined as “

a block of clay used to build structures.

” Similarly, the word suits the group, as the member countries can be seen as bricks that are helping build a new global economy, different from the existing one led by mostly western countries from Europe and North America. BRICS is often compared directly with the 

, consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States (and the European Union). In April 2023, 

a report published by Acorn Micro Consultancy

 showed that BRICS had surpassed the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the G7 countries in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.

The addition of new members is quite a rare sight at BRICS. It is only the second time in 15 years that the group has expanded, and the first time that multiple members would be joining at once. Similarly, the group has only had one name change. The renaming decision and process were much easier when South Africa was admitted, as only one alphabet needed to be added, and the ‘S’ fit perfectly at the end of ‘BRIC.’ However, the current expansion poses a much bigger challenge for BRICS. Before speculating on a new name, it would first need to be considered whether the existing members would go for a name change in the first place. This in itself would be a decision requiring in-depth discussion and consensus amongst member states. While this decision does not impact the material economic strength of the group, there are multiple factors to be considered regarding other implications. Firstly, the term “BRICS” is already fairly well-known amongst scholars, practitioners and the general public alike. While subject enthusiasts will catch on to the new name in no time, the term might not gain immediate traction amongst the masses. Secondly, while BRICS has often been 

criticised for being symbolic rather than a group for real change

, it is often seen as a true representative of the Global South’s aspirations to get their rightful say in shaping the global economic order.

There have already been multiple suggestions and speculations regarding a possible new name for the group. China’s Xi and Russia’s Putin have already suggested the name “

.” While this could be a possible option, the new members would clearly want to be well represented individually in the new name. Similarly, the name resembles those used by other groups such as the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (

 for dialogues and cooperation with member countries. However, such names suggest that the Plus represents countries that are external to the grouping, which would contradict the decision of BRICS to admit the six nations as ‘full members’, who would then be a part of BRICS rather than being external partners.

However, the suggestion is not without rationale, as it would avoid the difficult task of coming up with a name based on the traditional BRICS approach of just adding the first letter of each county’s name - AEEISU. The easiest option would be to go with the name “BRICSAEEISU”, which clearly does not read or sound well. Furthermore, it would be too long and complicated for people to remember. Another approach could be to keep every alphabet only once, meaning the alphabets I,E and S would represent two countries each, so as to avoid repetition and keep the acronym short. In this case, the probable name could be “BRICSEAU.” This limits the length to 8 alphabets and gives a French touch to the existing name, keeping it soft on the ear. Many have also voiced the possibility of a completely new and different name, doing away with the system of representing individual countries in the name. For example, a name containing the words, “alliance”, “emerging economies”, “global south”, etc. Similarly, the conclusion of a number could solve the problem, for example, taking inspiration from the “

.” However, such a move could take away the uniqueness of the group’s identity.

China and Russia suggested the name “BRICS Plus”

Although the name of the group might not be as important as the actual significance of its expansion, it is certainly something worth pondering on, for both experts and casual readers. While I have presented some possibilities and my thoughts on the current situation, only time will tell what BRICS’ identity will become in 2024. In the meantime, it would be rather interesting to read and listen to takes from scholars and readers that would appear over the next few weeks. 

Let us know your thoughts on the #BRICSNameGame. Do you think BRICS will change its name? Do you have a suggestion?

What’s in a Name? BRICS - Plus, AEEISU and more

The recent energy crisis in Europe has shown how vulnerable the world remains to future energy shortages. In this regard, I propose a reliable and green alternative.

Europe experienced a severe energy crisis starting in the last quarter of 2021. The post-pandemic reopening of global economies triggered a steep rise in demand. The lack of sufficient supplies caused by reduced investment in the energy sector due to the pandemic led to exponential growth in the prices of natural gas, coal, electricity, and other forms of energy compared to the same period in 2020. Since then, Europe’s energy problems have continued and highlighted a big weakness in their energy policy. The crisis was not the first of its kind but rather the latest instance in a series of periodic energy crises in the twenty-first century. I propose that submarine power cables run on renewable energy could be an all-encompassing solution to the challenges faced by global energy supply chains. Further, I argue that a global network of such cables could be the key to preventing future energy crises around the world.

A key reason contributing to the shortage was Russia's limitation of natural gas supply to Europe in order to meet its domestic demands. This was an indication of Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas, and this would become a problem for European countries in a situation of geopolitical tensions. The Russian invasion of Ukraine came less than six months later and can be seen as a manifestation of the same. Similarly, another problem was the empty renewable energy stores due to inadequate solar and wind availability during the summer. In the United Kingdom, the crisis was further aggrandised by the shortage of truck drivers, even leading to coal-based electricity companies shutting down due to the increasing costs. Thus, there are three main challenges that Europe needs to counter in order to prevent such an energy crisis in the future: 1) geopolitical uncertainty; 2) climate change; and 3) logistics.

This is where submarine power cables could provide an all-encompassing solution. Submarine cables have long been used for communications, including transferring data and internet broadband. Many of these are long intercontinental cables, such as those running across the Atlantic, connecting the Americas with Europe and Africa. On the other hand, submarine power cables have so far only been used over short distances, not more than 2-3 hundred kilometres. Such cables are found mostly in inland North America and Europe. However, there has been a rising trend of completed and proposed submarine power cables spanning large distances. For example, the 700 km North Sea Link between Norway and the UK became operational in 2021, making it the longest submarine power cable in the world. Similarly, the Australia-ASEAN Power Link (AAPL) is a proposed 4500 km undersea cable that would connect Australia and Singapore. Undersea power cables would play a significant role in reducing vulnerability to geopolitical events, especially in the case of Europe and North America as they would reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and natural gas. This would benefit those countries that depend on hostile or unreliable countries for their energy supply as undersea connections with friendly or allied countries would significantly increase their energy security.

Another common trend in energy production is the global shift from the conventional sources of coal, oil and natural gas to greener and renewable sources such as solar, hydro and wind energy. This has been a response to tackle the increasing global warming to which emissions from non-renewable energy contribute significantly. Today, we are witnessing a vicious cycle where the same climate change that has forced countries to move towards renewable sources is hampering the harnessing of renewable energy, as seen in Europe due to inadequate solar and wind availability in the last two summers. Therefore, submarine power cables alone are not enough if they are powered by non-renewable energy rather than green sources, since this will only further contribute to the cycle of increasing climate change and further hinder the harnessing of renewable energy required to counter it.

In this regard, it is important for these undersea cables to be powered by renewable sources, not only preventing further climate change induced by use of non-renewable sources but also preventing obstacles to the production of renewable energy. The use of green-energy submarine cables would also help reduce the variables in terms of logistics. For example, factors such as the closure of land borders, disruptions in transportation due to natural calamities or strikes, a rise in fuel costs, etc. Another problem of logistics seen in the current European energy crisis was that regions received erratic amounts of renewable resources such as sun and wind, often leading to an imbalance of supply and demand. Since renewable energy cannot be stored for long periods of time, a lot of potential is wasted. Submarine power cables would ensure regions receiving excess solar or wind energy could instantly transfer it to countries facing shortages. This would help reduce wastage as well as help regions battle scarcity of these resources.

While these cables provide many perceived benefits, they also face certain limitations. There are three types of challenges to the viability of such cables: 1) operational, 2) security and 3) legal. Firstly, the installation of power cables over long distances underwater is an expensive and time-consuming process. They also face problems with energy loss and the difficulty of conducting maintenance. Secondly, these cables, although installed with multiple protective layers, are still vulnerable to damage, causing disruption and waste of energy. Safety risks include damage from natural calamities such as cyclones or tornadoes as well as from fishing or naval activities. Similarly, while cables might eliminate risks emanating from geopolitical tensions, they remain greatly vulnerable to intentional sabotage from other states. This problem is further exacerbated in international waters due to the loss of wartime protection for undersea cables under international maritime law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

There have been multiple studies assessing the feasibility of long-distance submarine power cables powered by green energy from both an operational and legal angle, increasingly so since 2010. Many of these believed such ventures would not only be operationally feasible but also economically beneficial. Cables between North America and Europe, Europe and Africa, as well as Asia and Oceania, are some of the most widely discussed options. There has also been policy action to realise such projects. The most recent example includes India’s hypothesised undersea power cables to Saudi Arabia as well as a trilateral cable with France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These cables have empirically been effective over short distances, yet their performance over longer ranges and longer periods of time remains to be seen. However, it is certain that policy action amongst most governments has increased significantly, triggered by the combined effect of the pandemic, the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine, as countries strive for energy security.

Submarine Power Cables as a Renewable Solution to Future Energy Crises

Una visión de los vectores de la política exterior india en castellano para el público hispano.

Vectores cambiantes: La política exterior contemporánea de la India 

La política exterior de la India ha evolucionado significativamente desde su independencia en 1947 hasta ahora. Dicho esto, algunos de los principios en los que se basa siguen siendo los mismos incluso hoy en día. Desde ser uno de los países menos adelantados y de bajos ingresos después de la independencia hasta ser la quinta economía y la cuarta potencia militar del mundo, la India ha recorrido un largo camino, al igual que su política exterior. El reciente ascenso de la India combinado con la transición del orden global de ser unipolar a un futuro orden multipolar significa que la India se encuentra como un contendiente prominente a uno de los principales 'polos' del mundo. Debido a esta dinámica interna y externa, la India ciertamente ha tenido que alterar la dirección y la magnitud de su política exterior en muchos aspectos, pero al mismo tiempo, también ha reforzado algunas características de su enfoque de política exterior desde sus primeros años.

La política exterior de India puede clasificarse como una forma de 

" es un término utilizado para describir la política exterior pragmática de un país en virtud de la cual mantiene relaciones amistosas y predecibles con todas las potencias mundiales o países importantes para sus intereses. El término se ha asociado con mayor frecuencia al enfoque adoptado por los países de Asia Central para mantener el equilibrio entre Rusia, Estados Unidos (y Occidente), y ahora incluso China.

Si bien la política exterior de la India se basa en principios y circunstancias muy diferentes, es similar a este enfoque multivectorial en muchos sentidos. Uno de los vectores más importantes y antiguos de la política exterior de la India a lo largo de los últimos setenta años ha sido el de la '

.' La autonomía estratégica es la capacidad de un país para llevar a cabo su política exterior preferida incluso en presencia de presiones externas. La autonomía estratégica de la India tiene su origen en su principio ideológicamente arraigado de no alineación. El éxito de la política india de no alineación ha sido muy debatido, sin embargo, la política ha sido generalmente seguida por todos los gobiernos a nivel nacional hasta ahora. La diferenciación del gobierno actual entre el no alineamiento histórico y lo que hoy en día se denomina 

, todavía tiene como objetivo lograr el mismo objetivo, es decir. autonomía estratégica.

El elemento clave de su vector de autonomía estratégica ha sido el equilibrio entre Estados Unidos y Rusia. Desde estar más cerca de la Unión Soviética durante la Guerra Fría hasta las fuertes relaciones actuales con los Estados Unidos, la India ha logrado mantener relaciones amistosas con ambas superpotencias y ser un socio importante para ambas. La negativa de la India a criticar públicamente la invasión de Ucrania por parte de Rusia, incluso después de reiteradas presiones de la mayoría de sus socios estratégicos, incluidos los Estados Unidos, la UE y Japón muestran la importancia de mantener la autonomía estratégica como vector de política exterior para la India y han dado un vistazo al enfoque de política exterior de la India en un futuro próximo. El vector de autonomía estratégica de la India también da forma a su política exterior de equilibrar no solo a los Estados Unidos y Rusia, sino también a nivel multilateral. Por ejemplo, el multialineamiento de la India se puede ver donde se equilibra contra China, su principal rival estratégico a través del Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral con Estados Unidos, Japón y Australia. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, se equilibra contra la hegemonía económica de Occidente a través de los BRICS junto a China, Rusia, Brasil y Sudáfrica.

El segundo vector más importante de la política exterior de la India son sus relaciones con China. Está claro que hoy China es el mayor rival estratégico para la India. Siendo vecinos, las relaciones de la India con China tuvieron un comienzo positivo, pero han estado llenas de desconfianza desde la guerra sino-india de 1962. Los numerosos enfrentamientos fronterizos de los últimos cinco años han hecho muy difíciles las relaciones amistosas con China. Al mismo tiempo, la India también está envuelta en una intensa competencia estratégica y económica con China en términos de influencia global. Si bien China es claramente una de las principales potencias en el orden global con los Estados Unidos, las aspiraciones de la India a estar allí también son vistas 

. El impacto de China en la política exterior india es significativo. La India tiene como objetivo mantener relaciones económicas y diplomáticas estables con China mientras trata de reducir la dependencia económica de China y ser más autosuficiente. Del mismo modo, está tratando de contrarrestar a China en el ámbito marítimo en toda la región del Indo-pacífico, desde la costa africana hasta el mar de la China Meridional. Sin embargo, el enfoque de la India hacia China ha sido más cauteloso en comparación con sus socios occidentales debido a la gran asimetría que tiene en comparación con China, así como el hecho de que la India enfrenta mayores riesgos de un conflicto derivado del aumento de las tensiones con China, ya que comparte una frontera terrestre con ellos, a diferencia de Occidente.

China también ha sustituido a Pakistán como vector clave de la política de vecindad de India. En el siglo XXI, especialmente en la última década, la relevancia e importancia de Pakistán ha disminuido significativamente en la política exterior india. En la actualidad, aunque Pakistán sigue siendo un desafío clave en términos de seguridad nacional y amenazas terroristas, sólo se considera un vector secundario en la política exterior india desde el punto de vista estratégico, puesto que Pakistán ya no es un contrincante para India en la escena multilateral debido a que no ha logrado ascender tan rápidamente como India a causa de su inestabilidad política y económica. De hecho, Pakistán sólo es relevante para la política exterior india en lo que respecta a su 

Si bien la autonomía estratégica y las relaciones con China son vectores de larga data de la política exterior de la India, el próximo vector de las acciones exteriores de la India es mucho más reciente. Las aspiraciones de poder y la autosuficiencia. La India ha dejado claro que está a favor de un orden mundial multipolar y que aspira a ser uno de los centros de poder de ese sistema. Una parte de alcanzar este objetivo implica un crecimiento económico sostenido, que también es un objetivo nacional clave para el gobierno. La pandemia COVID-19 puso de manifiesto la necesidad de que los países fueran menos dependientes de las cadenas mundiales de suministro, que dependían en gran medida de China. Para la India, esto era mucho más importante no solo debido a la amenaza directa que enfrenta China, sino también por sus propias aspiraciones de poder. Por lo tanto, la autosuficiencia se ha convertido en un objetivo clave de la política exterior de la India como parte de su proyección de gran poder. Además, la política exterior de la India también se ha centrado en proyectarse en este papel de líder a nivel multilateral. Esto también se puede atribuir a la política exterior de Modi de mayor interacción global y proyección exterior que en parte se deriva de la ideología nacionalista del gobernante Partido Bharatiya Janata (BJP). La presidencia de la India del G-20 este año ha brindado otra oportunidad para que la India demuestre ser una de las 

futuras grandes potencias y líderes multilaterales

Otro vector relativamente nuevo pero significativo en la política exterior de la India es la región del Indo-Pacífico. La región del Indo-Pacífico se ha convertido en la región más importante del mundo y es probable que siga siéndolo en los próximos decenios. La región está viendo un juego de equilibrio de poder en tiempo real entre múltiples actores debido al ascenso de China como una potencia importante. La región del Indo-Pacífico está desempeñando un papel cada vez más importante en la política exterior de la India, y esto es visible a través de los recientes cambios de política de la India hacia esa región. La introducción de la política de Act East centrada en las relaciones con Asia Oriental y Sudoriental, Quad, así como los numerosos ejercicios marítimos conjuntos en los que la India ha participado durante los últimos años son ejemplos del enfoque de política exterior de la India. El Indo-Pacífico sirve como una región que ofrece la culminación de las prioridades más importantes de la India, tales como oportunidades para equilibrarse con China, para proyectarse aún más como una potencia regional y una potencia mundial potencial.

Por último, pero no menos importante, otro vector nuevo y muy importante de la política exterior de la India que tradicionalmente no se consideraba un vector central son las relaciones de la India con la Unión Europea. Las relaciones entre la UE e India han sido históricamente de valores compartidos, pero nunca han alcanzado su pleno potencial de cooperación. Sin embargo, en los últimos seis años, tras la nueva estrategia global de la UE y su creciente 

interacción con la India más allá del comercio

, la India se ha asegurado de corresponder. Las relaciones con la UE son muy importantes para la India desde la perspectiva de obtener más inversión extranjera directa, transferencia de tecnología, transición a la energía verde y cooperación multilateral. 

Si bien estos son algunos de los principales vectores de la actual política exterior de la India, hay muchos 

, como las relaciones de la India con África, la seguridad energética de la India, las relaciones de la India con Asia occidental, etc. Del mismo modo, es importante destacar el papel que desempeña la política interior en las perspectivas de la política exterior de India. El gobierno actual ha reiterado repetidamente la centralidad de los intereses nacionales fundamentales de la soberanía y el crecimiento económico como el foco de la política exterior de la India.

Para concluir, la política exterior de la India parece clara en términos de sus objetivos actuales. Sin embargo, hay muchos aspectos micro y macro que la India necesita entender en términos de la dirección y magnitud de cómo ejerce su política exterior. Por ejemplo, en la pequeña escala de las cosas, tiene que averiguar cómo equilibrar entre los Estados Unidos, Rusia, China y sus otros socios, mientras que en el panorama general, necesita una estrategia nacional formal para definir claramente su visión a largo plazo. El escenario actual en el que el mundo se encuentra en medio de los desafíos derivados de la crisis de Ucrania, la seguridad energética, la recuperación económica posterior a la pandemia, etc. ha proporcionado a la India no sólo obstáculos, sino también una oportunidad para acelerar el proceso de determinar los vectores básicos de su política exterior en un futuro próximo.

Comparing how ASEAN views the Chinese dominated RCEP vs the US led IPEF and where their interests lie?

RCEP or IPEF: Where do ASEAN states stand?

Launched in May 2022 by the United States, the 

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity

 (IPEF) includes seven of the ten ASEAN members as initial partners. While the IPEF has been compared to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which the US opted out of in 2017, it is not a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), but rather an economic arrangement aimed at tackling twenty-first century challenges. The IPEF is seen as a 

counter to Chinese economic influence in the Indo-Pacific

, especially after the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership came into effect in January 2022, as well as the US trying to regain economic leadership in the region after its withdrawal from the TPP. China has 

 as an attempt to force ASEAN countries to choose between China and the US. In this context, the question arises about the rationale behind ASEAN countries joining the IPEF and how they perceive its benefits compared to the RCEP.

The RCEP was the brainchild of ASEAN itself. ASEAN’s decision to propose a FTA can be attributed to 

, which is the impact of one government’s policies on the policy choices of other governments. The idea behind it was to protect its economic interests and 

 to the TPP and the China-Japan-South Korea FTA which had already been proposed prior to the RCEP’s conception in 2011. Furthermore, the decision was made easier by the fact that existing trade between ASEAN countries and non-ASEAN members of RCEP was already significant, including existing bilateral FTAs. However, it still took ten years of committed negotiations before the RCEP was finally signed in 2021 by all ten ASEAN members as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. ASEAN’s unanimous commitment to the RCEP comes from two factors. First are the expected 

 to increase regional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific, significantly reduce tariff barriers, provide easy access to markets, and transfer of technology boosting manufacturing. Secondly, the successful establishment of RCEP has helped maintain ‘

Unlike RCEP, the IPEF is a US-led enterprise rather than being an ASEAN-led initiative. Regardless, all ASEAN members excluding Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have joined the US, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and Fiji in initial negotiations. As voiced by senior leaders from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, the 

IPEF has been received positively by ASEAN

 countries. There are three main reasons for their decision to join the IPEF. Firstly, the agreement is in a nascent stage and therefore being part of the negotiations does not obligate ASEAN states to become signatories in the future. Similarly, the flexible nature of the IPEF allows countries to selectively be part of any or all of the 

: i) trade; ii) supply chains; iii) clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure; and iv) tax and anti-corruption. This means the members are not as bound by the framework compared to an FTA. Secondly, even though the US has rejected any possibility of removing tariff barriers under the IPEF, ASEAN states perceive economic benefits in other forms. For example, being part of the group could lead to 

greater foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer

 from the US and other non-ASEAN members. Contrastingly, opting out of the IPEF would make the country less attractive for American FDI and lose competitiveness to other ASEAN members. Lastly, joining the IPEF is consistent with ASEAN's hedging strategy, which includes 

simultaneous cooperation and confrontation with China

Even ASEAN countries which are not currently part of the IPEF have signalled that they 

. While Myanmar’s exclusion is due to the military regime in the country, the USA's 

 possibly stems from their close ties to China. This has received calls from these countries as well as within the US, to include them in the IPEF, a group that the US claims is ‘open.’

It is too early to compare whether the IPEF or the RCEP would benefit ASEAN countries more. However, it is clear that most ASEAN states are committed to both. The RCEP has seen some initial success with China’s trade with ASEAN and other states in the RCEP 

 over the first year. The two initiatives have largely been seen in the context of the US-China rivalry, but that does not necessarily mean that RCEP and IPEF are mutually opposed. In fact, ASEAN members view it as an opportunity to benefit from both simultaneously. While ASEAN is taking a risk-free chance with the IPEF, if it were to fail or demand greater commitment from members, the option of exiting remains open. Whether the RCEP or the IPEF would be better for ASEAN remains to be seen, however the fact that Southeast Asian countries are part of both, highlights their economic importance and helps reinforce ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific.