They carry out civilian duties, serve in non-military ministries, and monitor the streets. 

And in many nations after the dictatorships, the military continues to have disproportionate authority.

When he ran for office, Andrés Manuel López Obrador promised to remove the military from Mexico's streets and condemned their involvement in the fight against drug trafficking. 

But he has only increased their power during his term in office. 

He abolished the Federal Police in 2019 and replaced it with the National Guard, which was composed of 80% military men. And in August of last year, he said that the Ministry of Defense would take over control of the new organization created to combat crime, which had previously been under civilian authority.

This final policy, which has not yet been implemented, is just one of many that have given the military more authority and sway over the nation's government. 

In fact, López Obrador has given them responsibility for overseeing the building of several projects and their subsequent administration.

 is but one illustration. Some governments in Latin America have recently had a tendency to give the military roles other than defense, in order to strengthen their economic and social clout.

They are in charge of the most significant economic sectors in both 

Military leaders, both active and retired, have led ministries in 

. The increase of the military's duties in 

runs counter to what the country's laws have established. 

The success of the States and democracies in the region is at risk due to the military's rising stature in Latin America.

Rut Diamint, a specialist in regional security and civil-military relations, enumerates three factors that account for the military's growing political sway in the region:

The nature of military power has changed. 

Its prominence is only increasing, but it is important to remember that the forms today differ from those in the eras of dictatorships. Assuringly, Diamint states, "There are no military takeovers; instead, what we have is a very direct link to political decision-making."

Román Ortiz, a senior analyst at the Francisco de Vitoria University's Center for International Security, concurs: 

"There are two details that stand out to me as crucial. First off, while the military's occupation of state buildings gives them more influence, a coup d'état is not always the result. Point number two is that civilian politicians who are attempting to compensate for the vulnerabilities in their political base with military support are likewise driving this expanded role of the armed forces ".

The absence of a coup d'état threat does not imply that democracy or the operation of the state will necessarily benefit. The armed forces undoubtedly have the infrastructure and resources to handle issues that are bigger than many Latin American administrations. However, the addition of new features is not always necessary or even practical.

According to Ortiz, when the military forces are engaged in activities that have nothing to do with the tasks that are appropriate for them, they are unable to effectively carry out their responsibility for security and defense. 

Additionally, their lack of experience in non-military concerns does not ensure competent administration and could actually work against the State's ability to function.

The expert also emphasizes how these new functions could have a negative impact on civil-military relations.

Ortiz cites the Mexican situation as a specific illustration. 

Despite the fact that he defends military action against organized crime in that nation due to the powerful position some cartels hold, he issues the following warning: 

"The president eliminated the civilian component to carry out tasks at the federal level, which has less to do with the military playing a bigger role. As a result of the demise of the Federal Police, the military now plays a larger role in maintaining public safety." 

Fhola de S. Paulo reported that 92 other members of the armed services in Brazil occupied important posts in state-owned firms in 2021, right before a retired Army general was appointed president of Petrobras, Brazil's enormous state-owned oil corporation.

President Jair Bolsonaro urged them to conduct a parallel vote count in 2022 to ensure the integrity of the recent concluded elections. 

Bolsonaro declared at the official beginning of his prior reelection campaign in July that "the Army is on our side" a declaration that was seen as extremely unsettling for a president-candidate who was casting doubt on the reputable Brazilian electoral body.

President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador has likewise given the military more funding and authority, in violation of both the law and the peace accord that put an end to the country's civil conflict in the 1990s.

Numerous people draw attention to the fact that the president took control of the Legislative Assembly in February 2020 while being escorted by the military and the police in order to compel opponents to accept a budget that would support his Territorial Control Plan. 

The politicization of the armed forces in El Salvador is most evident in this instance, but there are others as well.

As well as using them to impose quarantines during COVID-19, Bukele promised to double the number of troops and has boosted the military budget by 76.8% since 2019.

Each state in the region has its own variations on the Latin American phenomena of military protagonism. 

"I believe that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are the three nations that have tried the hardest and done the best job of separating defense from public security issues. It was especially challenging in Chile because, unlike in Argentina or Uruguay, the armed forces still held prestige in addition to authority. Therefore, it was much harder to separate it from political power and its close ties to society "Explained by Diamint.

According to Ortiz, there is a clear politicization of the armed forces in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, but he cautions that these countries cannot be compared to the others because they are not democratic. He says that in the other nations, the strength of the democratic institutions will determine how much authority the military ultimately assumes and how it affects the administration of the State. He thinks that the military's authority may occasionally be reversible.

He does, however, note: "I believe that Bukele is an excellent illustration of how things cannot be undone, but they cannot be undone because he has completely destroyed El Salvador's democratic institutional framework, which was already weak and in decline. In an unusual way: by increasing the militarization of public security, utilizing wholly arbitrary systems to carry out enormous detentions without any judicial oversight, and eliminating liberties while taking advantage of the security issue in that nation ".

He does, however, emphasize the differences from what was observed in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. "It is a civilian politician that invites in the military to employ them in his strategy to perpetuate himself in power, not the Salvadoran military that has a political objective and subsequently assumes power." a notable distinction.

The Growing Influence of the Military in Latin America

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