Geographic significanceThe history of Andaman and Nicobar Islands begins with the Ramayana era. It was called Handuman throughout the Ramayana period, but as time pa

The history of Andaman and Nicobar Islands begins with the Ramayana era. It was called Handuman throughout the Ramayana period, but as time passed, it was renamed. Between 1014 AD and 1042 AD, the Chola Dynasty used the southern islands of this archipelago as a strategic naval base, referring to them as 'Ma-Nakkavaram,' a Tamil term meaning open land. The name was changed to 'Necuverann' by Venetian traveler Marco Polo, and the entire island group came to be known as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands under the British, who also utilized one of the islands as a minor naval station. The origins of the names of these islands reveal how linked the island chain was to the countries in its vicinity, as well as its geographical significance as a naval station. Currently, India's strategic emphasis is focused on these two features of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI), particularly in the context of pursuing its goals in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are two groupings of islands along the southern tip of the Bay of Bengal, encompassing an area of 8,249 square kilometers. The entire island chain is made up of 836 islands, islets, and rocky outcrops, 38 of which are permanently inhabited by a population of over 430,000 people. The islands are administered by the Central Government of India through the Andaman and Nicobar Administration as a single Union Territory. Port Blair, the capital city, is the seat of the Administration, which is led by the Lieutenant Governor, who serves as a direct link to the Central Government. The ANI also houses India's only integrated tri-service military forces command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which is responsible for maritime surveillance and boosting India's strategic presence in the eastern Indian Ocean as it merges with the Pacific.

A confluence of economic and strategic reasons has increased the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal and its littorals. The A&N Islands, which are larger than several island countries in its own, are strategically positioned and hence an advantage in India's security and strategic calculus. The Islands are located between Duncan's Passage and the Ten Degree Channel. The Preparis Channel and Six Degree Channel are located to the north and south, respectively, of the Island chain. All of these waterways are vital commercial routes for any shipping bound for Southeast and East Asia. The 572 islands, just 38 of which are inhabited, account for 30% of India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Andaman Sea's Six Degree and Ten Degree Channels, which lead to the Malacca Strait, are critical to the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that carry global commerce, particularly energy trade, between Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. The A&N Islands are located at the convergence of the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean, making them a key pivot of the Indo-Pacific. The Strait of Malacca is an 850-kilometer-long strait that connects the Malay Peninsula to the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The Strait of Malacca is one of the world's most vital maritime waterways. Every year, 94,000 vessels travel through, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans and transporting almost one-fourth of the world's trade, including oil and Chinese manufactured goods. The Strait is used by major Asian economies like as India, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

In recent years, China's efforts to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean Region in order to solve the Malacca Dilemma where China fears of a maritime blockade in the Malacca Strait and achieve its 'Maritime Silk Road' objectives have fueled concerns over freedom of navigation in these regions. China has been paying special attention to the Indian Ocean, which connects Chinese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) to African and Middle Eastern oil supplies, as well as European commercial routes. China imports almost six million barrels of oil each day, accounting for nearly 75% of total requirements. China thus has invested in naval infrastructure in the region over the last decade or two, which India perceives as deliberate encirclement.

This policy has been named the 'String of Pearls' by Western experts. China has steadily increased its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean littoral through continuous deployment of its naval forces, arms sales, the establishment of bases and access facilities, increased military diplomacy, the cultivation of special political relations with littorals, and the lavish disbursement of developmental finance for strategic purposes. It has increased the extent and frequency of its presence in the Gulf of Aden under the pretense of anti-piracy operations, with no regard for India's threat assessments. China has also steadily improved its Operational Turnaround (OTR) in the Indian Ocean, establishing additional bases such as Gwadar and Djibouti. This general pattern in the expansion of China's presence can also be seen in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, where Chinese navy and survey vessels have been on the lookout and have occasionally invaded India's EEZ without prior notice. As China's economic and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have increased, so has the inherent imperative to protect those interests. As a result, shoreline countries and global powers have sought to collaborate on security to secure free transit along the SLOCs. Because of their strategic location, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are well-suited to act as a focal point in such collaborations. India has attempted to use the islands' potential to safeguard its own interests and bolster its image as the region's "net security provider." To counter the growing Chinese footprint, India has resumed efforts to strengthen ties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.

Until now, strategic reasons skewed the balance between environmental preservation, tribe welfare, national security, and economic development in favour of isolating the Islands. The A&N Islands' economic potential had mostly gone untapped. Because the Islands provide India with a commanding geostrategic position in the Bay of Bengal as well as access to South and Southeast Asia, a concentrated development strategy for the Islands is predicted to significantly increase the country's geopolitical power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Recently, the Government of India (GOI) has pursued a proactive policy with the goal of transforming the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N Islands), a tri-services command, into an economic powerhouse as well as one of India's important centres of defence and security strategy. As a result, India has started to strengthen the capabilities of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), which oversees monitoring the shipping routes that travel through the islands. Following the Ladakh standoff with China in May 2020, India has tried to speed plans for additional forces, vessels, aircraft, and missile batteries to be stationed in the ANI. According to sources, the naval air stations INS Baaz and INS Kohassa are extending their support missions.

The ANC conducts cooperative maritime drills such as the Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise and Coordinated Patrols with Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia, taking advantage of its closeness to Southeast Asia. MILAN, a biennial multinational naval exercise, is also held to foster maritime friendship. The 2018 exercise drew twenty countries, making it the largest naval exercise in the Andaman Sea. A tribal reserve of 1,000 square kilometres has been established to house 300 Jarawas. This is implausible. The most strategically located island of Great Nicobar could be considered for partial opening by reserving approximately 25% of land for forests and housing the Shompen tribe (a population of approximately 400). The remaining 75% might be used for overall development, including strategic assets. Over the next two decades, the opening of ANI might create a million jobs. There is a need to promote both tourism and security while minimizing environmental effects. There is a need to strengthen inter-island communication via air and big high-speed boats, as well as telecom access.  

On June 1, 2017, the Government of India established the Island Development Agency (IDA) for the development of islands. For the first time, a project for sustainable development in the selected Islands has been launched under the auspices of the IDA. The initial phase covers four islands in Andaman and Nicobar. The emphasis is on job development through the promotion of tourism, seafood, and the coconut sector, among other things.  In the second phase, appropriate sites on 12 more Andaman and Nicobar Islands were identified. The Chennai-Andaman and Nicobar underwater internet cable was just inaugurated in 2020 to provide high-speed internet access to seven remote islands in the ANI chain: Swaraj Dweep (Havelock), Little Andaman, Car Nicobar, Kamorta, Great Nicobar, Long Island, and Rangat. This will also make business and tourism on the islands easier. If the islands' geographic significance is to be transformed into strategic utility, growth must permeate all parts of their management. To that end, and to capitalize on the island chain's proximity to Southeast Asia, India has embarked into a number of enterprises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India is on the verge of approving a proposal for the construction of defence facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). According to media sources, the Modi government is preparing a 10-year rolling plan to build facilities on the islands for extra troops, warships, aircraft, and drones, bolstering existing military capabilities.

Two sides to the opening up of the islands

Indian experts have frequently lamented the lengthy delay in developing the ANC's strategic capabilities over the years. However, India hasn't always found it simple to make what on the surface seems to be an obvious choice. The truth is that India's defence and foreign policy bureaucracies haven't always been on the same page when it comes to the strategic development of the ANC. It has been suggested by some in India's foreign policy community that converting the islands into a strategic-military hub could cause problems for Southeast Asian nations, which view India as a benign and friendly country. In fact, Malaysia and Indonesia weren't entirely supportive of India's decision to establish a military presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the middle of the 1990s. However, the rationale behind a "minimalist security presence" seemed to be abandoned as China's expanding influence in South Asia started to put India on the defensive in its own backyard.

There is some historical institutional resistance to enabling port visits to the A&N Islands by foreign warships in general and the US Navy in particular, notwithstanding occasional visits by other navies. Such a stance may have its roots in an earlier time when the geopolitical landscape was very different. The more general arguments against allowing other big navies access to the A&N Islands is that it might exacerbate China's "Malacca Dilemma" if military planes and ships from other large navies frequently visit the A&N Islands. These strategic contacts at the A&N Islands may enrage China and cause greater hostility between the two nations given the complexities of India-China bilateral relations. Increasing communication through warship and military aircraft visits may be an unsteady path that eventually leads to more complex requests for strategic cooperation through the joint deployment of naval and military assets for other contingencies outside the purview of India's direct strategic interests. India might be viewed as a component of a framework for cooperation against China in which other nations, such as the US, Australia, Japan, and others, are already parties to a formal military alliance. In the event that India adopts a conciliatory stance towards the visits of other powerful nations, there should be a significant reciprocity, notably with regard to the US and Australia.

China's unilateral stance and expanding strategic interests in the Indian Ocean must be taken into consideration while evaluating the current policy. Because of its "strategic autonomy," India should be able to make a choice that is not influenced by what the Chinese would think of its collaboration with other navies in the area of the A&N Islands. India can impose its supremacy on the important East-West maritime commerce route that flows through the Malacca Strait by using the A&N Islands as a strategic asset. It is frequently referred to as the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of India in the East. Nearly 80% of China's seaborne trade travels through this area, thus the prospect of it being restricted casts a shadow over the country's future known as the "Malacca Dilemma." However, there is no justification for denying access to the A&N Islands to the US, Japan, Australia, France, or the UK. Port visits can result in graded collaboration in all of its aspects between India and its main strategic allies in the A&N Islands. It is incorrect to interpret India's strategic engagement with its allies through their fleets' visits to the A&N Islands as an alliance framework. India has recently reached agreements for the sharing of logistics with the US, Australia, France, Singapore, and South Korea. Negotiations for a similar logistics-sharing deal with Japan are well underway. These concerns have been allayed, according to the development of these fundamental cooperative agreements, particularly with South Korea and other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) or QUAD Plus.

The focus was on tourism and port development in 2015 when the government initially declared its goal to turn the Andaman and Nicobar into a marine hub and allocated 10,000 crores for the project. The development plan does, however, also have an equally important economic component. There is a plan to build a transshipment facility at Campbell Bay, the largest of the Nicobar Islands, which is just 90 kilometers from the Malacca Strait, acknowledging the potential for the islands to improve trade. With INS Kohassa being developed for both military and civilian usage, efforts are being made to increase air connectivity and helicopter tourism. This will probably give the Center's UDAN initiative to improve regional connectivity a boost.

In recent years, the government has sought a strategy that would rationalize economic growth with environmental protection to ensure all round national development in response to the rising aspirations of the residents of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the national interest to fortify ties with Southeast Asia. As a result, subtle changes are being seen in the way the ANI's area is being controlled. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a perfect venue for cooperation between India and Southeast Asia due to their geographic location. According to most reports, India and other nations have a strong political commitment to developing these islands. The determination must, however, persevere in the face of the scepticism that has otherwise surrounded the future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The Indian Ocean Region is "at the top of our policy priorities," according to Prime Minister Modi, who just made his first overseas trip to Seychelles and Mauritius. The PM explained that the blue chakra (wheel) in the Indian flag symbolises the possibility of the "blue revolution" or "ocean economy."  The complete range of dangers must be considered in planning security and defence strategy. Special preparation is needed to address vulnerabilities specific to the Islands, such as the kidnapping of foreign tourists, hijacking of ships, poaching, and so forth. Asset distribution over the Islands must be planned. The ANI one day would be the "gatekeeper" of the island. Due to the limits of the current satellite cover, electronic connectivity on the Islands is hindered. The situation needs to be dealt with.

Time for India to Exercise Andaman and Nicobar Island’s Strategic Potential

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