The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has reiterated its commitment to the cause of humanitarian work in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPR

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has reiterated its commitment to the cause of humanitarian work in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) stating that the organisation "remains ready to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea and resume projects suspended during the coronavirus pandemic." 

In an interview with Yonhap News Agency, Olivier Ray, ICRC's Director for mobilisation, movement and partnerships, said that while the organisation does not have access to the DPRK due to the pandemic restrictions in place, it maintains contact with the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

The director also stated that the North Korean officials are aware of the ICRC's intentions to resume operations in Pyongyang. 

This statement from the ICRC comes in the backdrop of growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's rampant missile tests and the United States-Republic of Korea's provocative joint military exercises have severely threatened the status quo on the Korean Peninsula in recent times. Given the severity of the situation, as North Korea considers the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, the ICRC's commitment to humanitarian operations provides a new ray of hope for the commencement of dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.

The question of aid has been a contentious issue on the Korean Peninsula. Several international aid organisations have been compelled to cease operations in the DPRK due to the government's strict policy apparatus.  While some organisations like the MSF have criticised the North Korean government's stance, other organisations have continued working in a spirit of humanitarian resolve. 

Furthering aid has been criticised on numerous grounds in the past. The criticisms levied against humanitarian support have broadly been two fold: criticism on moral grounds and criticism citing lack of effectiveness. 

The arguments under criticism on moral grounds generally deal with the conduct of the international organisations working in the DPRK. It is argued that by working under such strict conditions, the international organisations cannot provide effective assistance to the needy. Another criticism made against the international organisations is that by deciding to continue operations in the DPRK, they support the regime and it's actions, even justifying its nuclear proliferation programme. The international organisations, however, claim that their conduct is based on humanitarian grounds and cooperation with the regime is part and parcel of providing humanitarian support in the DPRK. An example is the WFP which has worked with the DPRK government in providing food aid while not working as a distributing agency but furthering assistance to the government to fulfill the food aid programme. 

The arguments under lack of effectiveness generally deal with the policy aspect of humanitarian operations. Many policymakers believe that the humanitarian support does not materialise into peaceful conduct from the DPRK. According to them, it is this lack of effectiveness that not only fails to provide results but also funds the North Korean military buildup in some capacity. Hence, there is a growing disenchantment with the idea of providing aid to the DPRK at a policy level.

However, furthering aid provides an effective channel of diplomacy which can be exploited to extract meaningful results. 

Due to its recalcitrant posturing, the DPRK has been difficult to engage with in the past. This has led to numerous breakdowns in relations over the past few decades. While the DPRK has been apprehensive of the United States and the international community since the Korean War, it has never refused to accept aid and international help. The fall of the Soviet Union and the stagnation of its economy in the 90s has made North Korea realise the need for assistance in order to ensure survival. The Sunshine Policy under President Kim Dae-jung and the reconciliatory policies under President Moon Jae-in are testament to North Korea's willingness to cooperate in case its security concerns are neutralised. Aid and humanitarian assistance can form the bedrock of better relations between North Korea and the international community. By furthering aid the international community can work towards establishing confidence building measures with the North Korean government and can inturn facilitate reduction of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 

In this respect, humanitarian support offers an effective channel of diplomacy in dealing with North Korea. The reserves of trust established by furthering international humanitarian support can be used as a stepping stone to achieve dialogue and cooperation. However, a major issue with regard to the humanitarian operations in the DPRK is the lack of a joint framework among the international organisations. By establishing a common set of guidelines in collaboration with the North Korean government the international organisations can aim to solidify humanitarian support in the DPRK and ensure that the aid reaches the needy. 

Similarly, the lack of effectiveness can also be tackled if humanitarian support is provided to the DPRK without the expectation of an immediate dismantling of its nuclear proliferation program. Nuclear Disarmament must be seen as a goal to be achieved in the future and alternate channels of diplomacy like providing humanitarian support can work as a medium towards ensuring this goal is achieved effectively. 

The ICRC's statement comes at a time when North Korea is going through an agricultural crisis. Given the acute food shortages that the country is bound to face in the coming months it is imperative that it will require humanitarian support. The international community must capitalise on the opportunity and use this crisis as a way of bettering relations with the North Korean regime. While it is bound to be a long drawn process, a foundation laid on mutual trust and cooperation can lead the way in achieving a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula. Each occurring crisis presents a new opportunity for the international community to deal with the hostilities emerging in the Northeast Asian region. It is just about how long can the United States and Republic of Korea maintain parity with reality. 

Can Aid Initiate Dialogue on the Korean Peninsula

Early Bird

Over the past few decades, nuclear proliferation has become a major threat to global peace and security. These threats can be seen in instances of the transfer of nu

Over the past few decades, nuclear proliferation has become a major threat to global peace and security. These threats can be seen in instances of the transfer of nuclear technology through illicit networks, weapons testing, confrontational military buildup, and non-compliance with the international safeguards and treaties. While the non-proliferation regime has strengthened over time, the looming threat of nuclear warfare has persisted. The constant military buildup in the Northeast Asian region and the seemingly never-ending Russia-Ukraine war are some conflicts which have recently emerged as points of contention that could potentially lead to nuclear annihilation. 

While the need for nuclear disarmament has been recognised and heavily stressed upon, the rationale behind armament has been largely overlooked. The popular perception around disarmament has restricted the discourse to mere criticism of the aggressive posturing while completely ignoring and even disregarding the rationale behind the armament, the raison d'etre of nuclear weapons. However, it is through a comprehensive understanding of this rationale that irreversible disarmament can become a reality. 

States hold certain conscious and unconscious estimations regarding their security needs. These estimations can be influenced by a country’s historical background, geographical location, its aspirations or the ambitions of nations around it. Such estimations are known as threat perceptions. Threat perceptions represent the rationale behind a state’s actions in the international realm. Diplomatic advances, skirmishes, conflicts and alliances are heavily influenced by these threat perceptions.

For instance, India's decision to develop its nuclear programme via the Pokhran II tests in 1994 was rooted in its security assessments. As stated by the then Foreign minister Jaswant Singh in his influential article titled 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', India's decision was influenced by the failure of the non proliferation regime in dealing with the issue of nuclear proliferation and the discriminatory nature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Similarly, China's decision to acquire nuclear weapons in 1964 was heavily influenced by the security dillema stemming from the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. North Korea's nuclear proliferation programme, too, has its raison d'etre in the devastation it suffered in the Korean War and the sanctions and existential threats that it has faced in the years since. In recent times, Iran's decision to go nuclear, if it materialises, will result from the threat of Israeli armament and the failure of the non proliferation regime in addressing Iran's concerns via an agreement on the stalled Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

As these threat perceptions greatly affect the actions of the states, they can be effectively used to discern the motives behind those actions. Once the motives behind armament can be ascertained, their addressal can pave the way for achieving disarmament. Such an assessment can then be used to formulate roadmaps to reach the various stages of disarmament. 

However, a major roadblock in assessing threat perceptions is the accuracy of the assessments reached. If the assessments do not coincide with the threat perceptions a state holds, the policy formulations can backfire leading to a stalemate. Hence, it is important to make sure that the policy assessments coincide with realistic assessments of the states. To ensure this, it is important to engage with the concerned nations. 

While engagement becomes a necessity, it is hard to achieve given the dearth of trust conflicting states hold for each other. Even when diplomatic relations are pursued in such a situation, they often lack trust and cooperation, resulting in breakdowns in the long run. Hence, a measure which can be implemented to escape the prospects of a stalemate is channeling diplomatic relations by exploring alternative channels of diplomacy. Alternate channels of diplomacy involves pursuing engagement while not addressing disarmament as a task which needs to be immediately achieved. These channels may include engagement in the realms of culture, environment, technology, economy and people-to-people contacts. Alternate channels of diplomacy can help in reducing the lack of trust between the states as they focus on meaningful engagement aimed at improving relations in the long run. Such improvement can contribute towards laying the bedrock for better and more concrete dialogue. After ensuring a new found trust, the states can pursue their issues of concern. The difference being, that even if the talks break down, it is plausible that the states will find their way back to the negotiations table given the trust and cooperation achieved through the confidence building measures. 

Understanding Threat Perceptions: Key to Nuclear Disarmament 

On Monday, the United States State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, raised concerns over the possibility of North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test. Answeri

On Monday, the United States State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, raised concerns over the possibility of North Korea conducting a seventh nuclear test. Answering questions from journalists in a 

, Price stated that North Korea has finalised all of the steps needed to conduct a nuclear test, severely threatening peace and security in the region. These concerns have only followed what has been a tumultuous time on the Korean Peninsula. Since the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, the Korean Peninsula has experienced heightened tensions courtesy of North Korea’s missile tests and the US-ROK joint military exercises. 

On March 13, the United States and South Korea 

 into yet another joint military exercise, their largest in five years. These drills are set to continue for ten days, making it the most prolonged continuous military training held between the two nations. While the United States has defended these drills as part of a defensive measure, North Korea has 

 them as grave military provocations. As a direct response to the recent military exercises, North Korea 

 two short-range ballistic missiles, indicating its intentions to further escalate the tensions if the US and South Korea do not cease the military drills. 

While the US and ROK administrations have attempted to employ military drills as a tool for pressurising North Korea into entering negotiations on denuclearisation, this arm-twisting tactic has seemingly backfired. Since the beginning of the joint military exercises, North Korea has conducted an 

 number of missile tests, firing around seventy missiles in 2022 alone. This staggering statistic has been backed by DPRK’s 

 of a nuclear first-use policy in September last year, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons preemptively “in case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed under danger owing to an attack by hostile forces.”

These provocative actions undertaken by both sides have seriously jeopardised peace and security in the region. North Korea has significantly ramped up its missile testing in recent months indicating the possibility of a nuclear test which could result in further miniaturisation of its nuclear warheads. Such a situation will have a significant impact on the security of the United States' strategic assets in the region, as well as those of its allies. Consequently, a nuclear test can significantly alter the region's geopolitics, putting the entire world in danger of nuclear annihilation. Such a situation calls for an immediate and cardinal end to the hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and a return back to negotiations. However, it is highly unlikely that such a move will eventually come from the North Korean side. The rationale behind North Korea’s nuclear proliferation programme has been to ensure regime survival. The inability of the current status quo to challenge North Korea’s regime survival limits the chances of the North Korean leadership voluntarily entering denuclearisation negotiations. On the other hand, the international community cannot wait for a nuclear test to seriously consider initiating denuclearisation talks. Hence, the negotiation process must emerge from the efforts of the international community. 

While the United States and South Korea have claimed the military drills to be a viable way of bringing North Korea to the negotiating table, there is no surety from either past experiences or policy assessments that such a tactic can prove to help establish peace on the Peninsula. The United States and South Korean administrations have so far claimed to keep the diplomatic option open with North Korea. However, for diplomacy and dialogue to become a reality, arrangements necessary for establishing trust and cooperation must be actively pursued. In such a pursuit, however, the current arrangements posing as impediments to the establishment of a peaceful order must also be dismantled. A starting point for this can be giving up a hostile policy in favour of a policy rooted in the principles of trust and cooperation. The United States and South Korea must recognise that the nuclear issue will not cease to exist without engaging with North Korea. However, the continued hostilities, whether in the form of military drills or 

 North Korea as an enemy, do not serve the purpose of ensuring trust and cooperation in the negotiation process. Such a policy also prevents diplomatic manoeuvering in instances where dialogue might be possible. 

The United States and South Korean administrations must recognise the redundancy of the current policy measures in resolving the nuclear threat and look towards necessitating policies favouring a return back to the negotiation table. As North Korea steers through a major 

, it is possible that furthering aid in an attempt to better relations can serve to build trust and cooperation which can become the bedrock of concrete negotiations in the future. The international community must not pass on such an opportunity before the crisis on the Korean Peninsula reaches a point of no return.

Cover Photo: (Photo White House / Cameron Smith, via Wikimedia Commons)

Need of the Hour: A New North Korea Policy

Much like the immediate years after the Second World War, the third world finds itself increasingly engulfed in an ensuing Cold War. The great power tussle between t

Much like the immediate years after the Second World War, the third world finds itself increasingly engulfed in an ensuing Cold War. The great power tussle between the hegemon western bloc and the emerging counter-hegemon bloc, primarily led by the China-Russia alliance, has resulted in a return to the Cold War era of consolidating presences and striking alliances, particularly in the third world. The third world, on the other hand, faces the much difficult challenge of trying to avoid subordination while maintaining sovereignty. India's conduct since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war has been a glowing testament to this. India, so far, has successfully maintained strategic autonomy while playing the balancing act rooted in the policy of non-alignment. Historically, the policy of non-alignment has been a vital part of India's policy assessments. Emerging from the Nehruvian era, non-alignment has served India's interests in a changing world over the years. 

As India faces challenging times ladened with geopolitical uncertainties, the policy of non-alignment must continue to direct India's foreign policy assessments. 

Indian foreign policy in a changing world

In recent times, India has found itself at the epicentre of significant geopolitical changes. The Russia-Ukraine war has come about as a watershed moment in international politics, marking a clear shift in the world order. The war has played a polarising role, effectively dividing nation states into two distinct camps: sustainers of the western liberal order and its challengers. However, India's situation is more nuanced than this binary dichotomy. While India has grown closer to the United States and the Western European countries in recent decades; Russia, being a time tested friend, has provided itself as a major source of 

 imports facilitating India's needs. India has, therefore, been hesitant to abandon one bloc in favour of the other. Maintaining cordial ties with both blocs, however, is a difficult endeavour that has its own set of problems. India has recently come under the scanner for increasing its 

 from Russia and for its stance towards the western imposed 

, India has so far avoided sanctions, advocating in favour of maintaining closer ties with Russia. However, maintaining strategic autonomy in the face of external pressures is a challenging feat, nevertheless, in a highly polarised environment.

The policy of non-alignment emerged as a response to the polarising world order of the Cold War era. Non-alignment advocated for, as the name implies, non compliance with any of the blocs while making sense of the international environment and guiding foreign policy autonomously. 

For India, there were largely three factors that led to the adoption of non-alignment as the basis of foreign policy. These were: nationalist inclinations, proximity to the Soviet Union, and the economic troubles that India faced at the time of Independence.

During the years of the freedom struggle, the Indian leadership recognised the lack of any immediate external military threats. In the absence of any such threats, the biggest concern was being drawn into the conflicts created by great power rivalries. This further solidified the belief that internal security must be given priority over the imperialist adventures of powers like Britain. This assessment carried over to the Independence movement, forming the pillar for the eventual policy of non-alignment. 

Another reason for adopting the non-aligned policy was India’s proximity to the Soviet Union. Other than the obvious geographical proximity, the USSR was admired by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru admired its rapid and successful industrialization and retained a positive opinion of the USSR. Being the largest democracy, India seemed fit for joining the Western bloc, however, Nehru’s admiration of the USSR and geographical proximity to both the USSR and China led to India adopting a more balanced approach. 

A third factor which contributed to upholding the principle of non-alignment was India’s socio-economic situation in the post-independence era. The Indian economy in 1947 was stagnant with the country being highly dependent on agriculture which could not sustain the needs of a growing population. Nehru believed peace to be a prerequisite for development. Hence, a policy of non-alignment would allow India to minimise its defence expenditure, reduce the chances of costly conflict, and draw on multiple sources of aid without any strict conditions. 

In the current geopolitical situation, India finds itself at the centre of an increasingly polarising world order. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has sharpened the global power divide, marking clearly the distinctions between the two power blocs. Amidst growing external pressures which threaten autonomous decision making capabilities, India must look towards employing a balancing act similar to the non-aligned stance in order to serve its national interests. 

Over the past few years, India has grown closer to the United States, being increasingly involved in the ensuing US-China rivalry in the region. While the recent border conflicts highlight India’s concerns, these threat perceptions have been further intensified under the influence of the United States. As India has emerged as a key global player, it has been pushed into compliance with the western order, putting it at odds with China. However, the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the continuing conflict in Ukraine have brought the infallibility of the western rules based order into question. Amidst growing uncertainties, it is imperative for India to pursue a policy that places its national interests at the forefront of its foreign policy objectives. In the current state of affairs, India's primary concern is to maintain peace and stability in the region while assuring an independent foreign policy free of external interventions. In such a scenario, non-alignment presents itself as a viable alternative seeking to fulfil India’s national interests. 

While being a highly contentious region, peace and stability serves as a common goal and a prerequisite for growth and development in India’s neighbourhood. A better employed balancing act can further India’s interests in the region. Non-alignment can lead towards bridging the trust deficit between India and its neighbours. Non-alignment can also help India in striking strategic alliances irrespective of bloc power politics. 

Often criticised as a measure rooted in idealism, non alignment has been downplayed by various strategists as a measure of the past which does not reflect the present concerns. However, India’s recent policy posturing reflects a return back to the strategic ambiguity and non-compliance of the non-alignment era. In the past as well, the adoption of the non-alignment policy was not just an idealistic dream of the political leadership but a decision rooted in realistic assessment of India’s geopolitical concerns. 

While not a mirror image of the past, the current geopolitical situation is not much different from the tussle of the Cold War era. The geopolitical uncertainty is set to rise with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine contributing to the seemingly rising tensions. In a world ladened with uncertainties and challenges, India must continue on the path of the balancing act, defining its foreign policy on the grounds of national interests and cordial relations. 

Non-Alignment: India's Grand Strategy 

According to a recent study by the Chey Institute of Advanced Studies, a South Korea based think tank, 76% of South Koreans support the idea of nuclear proliferation

 by the Chey Institute of Advanced Studies, a South Korea based think tank, 76% of South Koreans support the idea of nuclear proliferation as a way of countering the growing North Korean nuclear threat. This staggering statistic has followed recent calls for the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula arising from various sections of the South Korean and United States governments. While South Korea's concerns are rooted in reality, nuclear armament as a way of addressing the North Korean threat can lead to disastrous consequences, not just for Northeast Asia but the entire world.

Recent events on the Korean Peninsula have been unprecedented in nature. In 2022 alone, North Korea 

 around 70 missiles including eight intercontinental ballistic missiles, stepping up efforts to develop long range nuclear weapons to undermine the U.S.-South Korea joint defence systems. The recent high volume of missile tests from the North have been met with retaliatory measures from the United States and South Korea. In August 2022, the US and South Korea began their 

 in recent years in an effort to increase readiness in the event of a North Korean nuclear test. In an effort to reinforce the security of its allies, the United States also participated in a series of 

 with Japan and South Korea. However, it appears that these military drills have only exacerbated the situation. North Korea has considerably accelerated its missile testing since the commencement of the military exercises, putting regional security and stability in jeopardy. Another aim of the drills, to put pressure on North Korea to enter into denuclearisation talks, has also failed. North Korea has persisted on its nuclear proliferation route, hinting at the prospect of a seventh 

The ever growing hostilities on the Korean Peninsula have been further propelled by the possibilities of deployment and development of nuclear weapons to aid Seoul as a deterrent against Pyongyang’s nuclear threats. Recently, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, in a Defence and Foreign ministry joint policy briefing, 

 that South Korea would consider building its own nuclear weapons and look towards playing a more active role in the redeployment and management of US’ nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This statement comes as a sharp shift from the policies of previous South Korean administrations with respect to the redeployment of US’ nuclear assets which were withdrawn in 1991 following global nuclear arms reduction measures. President Yoon has been a vocal supporter of redeploying the US’ strategic assets, previously 

 the idea in the run up to his election campaign. While keeping the development of indigenous nuclear weapons as a policy option, President Yoon has reiterated South Korea’s policy of working closely with the United States.

The United States, in an attempt to reassure South Korea over its nuclear and strategic commitment, has 

 to expand and elevate joint exercises and military training. In Seoul for bilateral defence ministerial talks, the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin 

 United States’ commitment to South Korea as “ironclad” at a time of heightened tensions. 

While South Korea has decided to strengthen its alliance with the United States as a countermeasure against North Korea’s aggression for now, the growing support for nuclear proliferation has led to various strategists making a case for a South Korean indigenous nuclear proliferation programme. However, the feasibility of such a measure must be analysed as it can lead to disastrous consequences which can potentially alter security relations and seriously jeopardise peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region. 

Much like the ramped up joint military exercises, a nuclear proliferation programme is set to be met with 

 from the North. North Korea views the US-ROK alliance in the region as a grave security threat to its survival interests. This threat perception stems from the devastation it faced during the Korean War and is further amplified by the joint bilateral and trilateral military exercises that the United States and its allies have carried out in the region. 

Historically, the issue of nuclear proliferation has been a bone of contention between the two Koreas. During the dictatorial rule of military leader Park Chung hee, South Korea embarked on an expensive and highly secret nuclear proliferation programme to reprocess plutonium into weapon grade fuel and build atomic weapons. However, this programme was foiled due to an intervention from the Kissinger administration seeking to control heightening Cold War tensions. This event greatly directed North Korea's nuclear ambitions as it identified a potential South Korean nuclear programme as a threat and sought to preempt its superiority. 

Even Inter-Korean dialogues under subsequent administrations such as the 

 (1998) deliberately kept the nuclear issue out of discussions in order to reach consensus on a peaceful regime. However, while both the countries have signed joint communiques calling for an end to nuclear weapons on the Peninsula, little has come out of these agreements. 

Hence, a nuclear proliferation programme or redeployment of US nuclear assets provides no certainty for peace to be established amidst all the hostilities. The subsequent security dilemma emerging from such a policy has the potential of pushing the Korean Peninsula into an era of further uncertainty. 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme emerged as a response to the growing survival threat it faced in the 1980s owing to the collapse of the communist bloc and the threat posed by the US' nuclear umbrella over the South. This threat perception has continued in the form of sanctions imposed against North Korea and the continuing military exercises in the region. While nuclear weapons have become intrinsic to North Korea’s foreign policy assessments, their use has been limited to that of a signalling tool, often reduced to mere rhetoric. 

Signalling presents a way to show an adversary the strength of one’s resolve. States tend to signal their resolve in a bid to gain desired outcomes. The North Korean threats are similar in this respect. By using the threat of nuclear weapons, the North Korean leadership seeks to extract favourable outcomes. In the past, North Korea has been successful in bringing the United States and the international community to the negotiation table while extracting desired results in the process. The Agreed Framework (1994), the Six Party Talks (2003), the Panmunjom Declaration (2018) and the Hanoi Summit (2019) are a testament to this nuclear diplomacy. North Korea’s threat perception is survival in nature and so are its desires and demands. Hence, for establishing a peaceful regime on the Peninsula, an aggressive and retaliatory policy must be given up in favour of a policy rooted in reconciliation and dialogue. The highest points in Inter-Korean relations have been reached under administrations which have favoured dialogue and diplomacy over the use of coercive measures in dealing with North Korea. Former South Korean President Kim Dae jung's Sunshine Policy, as well as former President Moon Jae-in's reconciliatory policies demonstrate that peaceful solutions on the Korean Peninsula are achievable if reconciliation and dialogue take precedence over distrust and coercion.

Development or deployment of nuclear weapons in the current state of affairs will lead to further flaring of hostilities between the two Koreas. Such an arrangement could push North Korea towards conducting its seventh nuclear test. A successful nuclear test can enable North Korea to further miniaturise its nuclear warheads, which can be critical in developing a tactical nuclear arsenal. Such a scenario will have a significant impact on the security of all the actors in the Northeast Asian region, significantly altering security relations. The US-ROK alliance needs to address North Korea’s growing threat perceptions ensuring that its survival interests are not threatened. While the dearth of trust and cooperation repels both parties from dialogue and discussion, the common desire for peace and stability must become the foundation for establishing fruitful relations for a better future.

Can Aid Initiate Dialogue on the Korean Peninsula

Understanding Threat Perceptions: Key to Nuclear Disarmament

Need of the Hour: A New North Korea Policy

Non-Alignment: India's Grand Strategy

Fighting fire with fire: Can Nuclear Proliferation address South Korea's concerns