Despite the worries expressed by US President Joe Biden in his statements on October 6, it is likely that we are no closer to witnessing a Russian first use of nuclear weapons than we were at the end of February. 

According to US President Joe Biden, this is the most hazardous crisis the world has experienced since the 

He warned that any deployment of tactical nuclear weapons might bring about "

 that Russia is any closer to using nuclear weapons than it was at the end of February, according to officials from the Biden administration who spoke to reporters after the event. 

They claimed that Biden was making an effort to draw attention to how dangerous Putin's threats were while yet sending Moscow deterrent messages.

 because any deployment of nuclear weapons on territories that he claims to be part of Russia would be disastrous from a public relations and diplomatic standpoint. 

On February 24, 2022, as military operations against Ukraine commenced, Putin vowed to deploy nuclear weapons for the first time (following his offensive in 2014). Instead of Ukraine, 

this threat seemed to be aimed at the United States and the NATO Allies

 (such as with nuclear use on the battlefield). At the time, Putin 

"Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states. Moreover, it has a certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons. In this context, there should be no doubt for anyone that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country." 

After a few days, on February 27, Putin gave the 

 to Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, and Valery Gerasimov, the head of the armed forces' general staff, to put the "Russian Army's deterrence forces on high combat alert" because "top NATO officials are indulging in aggressive statements directed at our country." 

Putin and his "war team"; Valery Gerasimov & Sergei Shoigu

But there were no discernible changes in Russia's nuclear posture as a result of this instruction. 

In other words, Russia did not prepare its strategic nuclear forces for an impending launch

, a move that would have likely been apparent to US intelligence and detectable through open-source surveillance of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. 

 that no US or NATO military directly intervene on Ukraine's behalf. 

The goal of Putin's high-alert order was 

 in Western analysts and decision-makers so that they would pay more attention to the growing nuclear threat than to helping Ukraine. 

 is a technique for influencing an opponent's thinking that is well-known in Russian strategic circles. 

The fact that Russia did not alter its nuclear posture in response, however, undermined the impact of Putin's directive and made the event's 

The so-called "special alert" was actually just a system check that 

any nuclear-armed state would conduct before starting a serious battle with a neighbor

(and that any state would perform prior to initiating a large-scale conflict involving dual-capable forces)

In response to Putin's directive, Shoigu made the somewhat flimsy 

 that "enhanced personnel" will be stationed at the "command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Northern and Pacific Fleets, and long-range aviation commands." 

Even though some well-known Western voices urged restraint, many others started to consider ways to reduce the likelihood of Russian nuclear strikes, 

Russian forces also interfered with operations at the Chernobyl site and the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Facility, the biggest such plant in Europe, causing even more alarm and discord among Western analysts and leaders. 

These actions were described as "nuclear terrorism" by Kiev. 

Additionally, from February to September, notable Russians such Aleksey Zhuravlyov, a member of parliament, and former president and current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev advocated for Russia to use nuclear weapons to defeat Ukraine in its conflict. It's vital to keep in mind that these early threats were made at the West rather than Ukraine in an effort to deter Western intervention.

On September 21, Putin declared that some Russian people would be mobilized to intensify his waning onslaught against Ukraine. He increased his nuclear threats on the West in the same 

"I would like to remind those who make such statements regarding Russia that our country has different types of weapons as well, and some of them are more modern than the weapons NATO countries have. In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.

The citizens of Russia can rest assured that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be defended – I repeat – by all the systems available to us. Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around."

 on September 30, he condemned the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts and threatened to "protect our land with all the forces and means at our disposal." 

He implied that if Ukrainian forces threatened to end the Russian occupation, Russia could use nuclear weapons against them. Insisting that the US using nuclear weapons to finish WWII would legitimize the same Russian action in the future. 

He continued by citing the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as creating "a precedent" that intimidated "both our country and the entire world."

Russian threats to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine are unreliable:

The concern that Russia would use "tactical" nuclear weapons in Ukraine reflects a fundamental but understandable misunderstanding of what Putin has said (seeking to thwart direct Western engagement) and 

how Russia views nuclear weapons in conflict. 

While it may be tempting to assume that Russia's most recent nuclear threats are directed at Ukraine, it is important to remember that on the one hand, Russia has annexed territory it does not currently control and on the other, Putin has refrained from directly threatening Ukraine with a nuclear attack should it reject his offer for negotiations. 

was meant to pressure the West into pressuring Ukraine into talks and to effectively freeze the battlefield as it is

, giving Russia the time and space it needs to reassemble its land troops. 

If Russia was serious, the raid on Belgorod, the attack on the Saky Air Base, or the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, in addition to the ongoing fighting along the front lines, would have been sufficient to justify a use of nukes. 

The aftermath of the attack on Kerch Bridge in Crimea. 

However, the doctrine and posture of the Russian nuclear force do not support such worries. 

Non-strategic nuclear use is viewed by Russia as a prescribed "dosage" of violence to "

" the enemy, prevent it from escalating, or force it into capitulating in such escalation-prevention scenarios. 

Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukrainian targets in this battle is therefore 

Thinking about the tactical use of nuclear weapons may help to clarify the fundamental ideas of this conclusion. This is not to claim that doctrine is determinant, given that Putin has acted in ways that are against every logical military doctrine during this conflict. 

However, the majority of analysts believe he would only deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine if there was something to gain from doing so.

In order to employ tactical nuclear weapons in the ongoing fight, Russia would need to respond to the following four issues:

1) Who or what is the nuclear attack's target?

2) How is the target expected to respond?

3) What kind of nuclear bomb would be most effective in having the desired effect?

There are three possible uses for Russian nuclear weapons in its conflict with Ukraine: 

1) A demonstrative hit against a sparsely inhabited area, such the Black Sea; 

3) A counter value strike against a populous place to try to end the war politically or perhaps decapitate the Ukrainian government. 

, as 1 would almost certainly have little impact on Ukraine's resolve to fight, or the West's support for Ukraine but would result in enormous political backlash worldwide. 

A large coalition of nations, including those that are currently neutral or even in favor of the war effort, would target Russia and Putin for defeat in Scenario 3, which would undoubtedly enhance Ukraine's willingness to fight and the world's support for Ukraine's struggle. 

And for each of these three possibilities, the issue of what comes next looms large. Russia may face political, economic, and perhaps even military punishment if scenarios 1 and 3 fail to put an end to the conflict on their terms.

To put it simply, though, Ukraine does not offer any compelling military targets for Russian nuclear weapons. 

A 10- to 100-kiloton bomb is not appropriate given the size and concentration of forces in Ukraine. 

Smaller nuclear weapons would be even less useful because their effects, especially when using thermobaric warheads, that are surpassed by those of high-end precision mass-effect artillery, such as the Tornado-G and -S and the TOS-1M/1A and TOS-2, below 10 kilotons. 

Conventional artillery strikes, like the one at 

 in July 2014, demonstrate similar levels of combat effectiveness without violating the nuclear taboo, risking global opprobrium, releasing dangerous radioactive fallout, or 

Tactical nuclear weapons are also much less decisive than one might think. Putin is thus faced with two poor nuclear options: either use several tiny warheads to significantly affect the battlefield 

(with a real threat of intervention and escalation)

, or use one massive theater nuclear weapon to significantly affect politics

 (and still risk intervention and escalation). 

Numerous tactical nuclear weapons would be needed to defeat the Ukrainian army on the battlefield in order to have a significant military impact, not just one hit. 

In fact, the US Army had 136 nuclear attacks planned to accomplish a conclusive victory over a front that was 60 miles long, even as the frontlines between Russia and Ukraine 

currently cover approximately 400 kilometers. 

The risks of radiation from this many attacks, not to mention the 

 of watching such devastation on Russian soldiers, would be significant, decreasing their combat effectiveness and already limited capacity to exploit holes in Ukrainian defensive lines. 

, which will have an immediate impact on all soldiers in the open, regardless of their allegiance, as well as the spread of fallout into occupied Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, which will frighten people who are already on edge due to Ukrainian strikes in Russia and the occupied Crimea. 

Furthermore, any such strikes would be completely ineffective if the goal is to undermine Ukraine's determination or the resolve of the West. Breaking the 77-year ban on the use of nuclear weapons in combat 

will only enlist more nations in the cause

There are worries that, with its annexation and pledge to use nuclear weapons to defend freshly acquired territory, Russia may be entering a new phase of escalation. 

 or alerts that would indicate such a strike is about to occur. 

Russia's military would go into a very high and noticeable alert posture if it were about to use nuclear weapons, even the smallest of battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons. This change would be necessary because Russia would need to protect itself from the possibility—however remote—that the US and NATO might launch a decisive nuclear attack against it in order to overthrow its government or hinder its capacity to carry out nuclear operations. 

 of tactical or theater nuclear weapons, there would be noticeable modifications to Russia's strategic nuclear forces. 

Since Putin's most recent nuclear threats, 

US authorities have made it very obvious that there have been no appreciable modifications to Russia's alert levels

, and open-source imagery would likely detect any such alteration in Russia's nuclear posture.

Furthermore, the transfer of nuclear warheads from a location of storage to a site of delivery 

 Even in the first and third cases where Russia could detonate a single nuclear bomb, Russia would still need to transfer more warheads for backup. 

In case 2, a large number of nuclear weapons could be removed from storage. 

Since all Russian nuclear weapons are stored in 'central storage' (Object-S) sites like Belgorod-22, just over 16 km from the Ukrainian border, or at base sites like the 448th Missile Brigade close to Kursk, 

any such deployment of live nuclear warheads would require a huge logistical operation

. In order to accomplish this, the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence's maintenance, safety, and security unit would need to be activated and moved.

Each nuclear weapon storage site is given maintenance, safety, and security units, as well as specialized super-containers for transporting nuclear warheads, unique railcars, specific warhead-transportation vehicles, specialized security vehicles, and radiological-defence units. 

Operational security, as well as specialized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, would be needed for the receiving military force as well. Warheads would then be transported in convoy to a different location to be coupled with delivery systems (artillery, free-fall bombs, or missiles), deployed to launch locations, and then released from 12th GUMO control to certain units for delivery, as 

Additionally, Russia would likely deploy more warheads to alternative launch sites to prepare for a variety of situations, such as a malfunctioning warhead or to avoid getting "caught cold," such as the case where a first strike fails to make a significant strategic impact on the course of the conflict. 

Tens of thousands of soldiers would be involved

 in the deployment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield because all of these maneuvers would take place during a period of increased general alert for Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

This is why Russia won't use Nuclear Weapons

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