 IntroductionThe maritime realm is essentially where the geopolitical fault lines of the twenty-first century are being played out. For instance, China is constructi

The maritime realm is essentially where the geopolitical fault lines of the twenty-first century are being played out. For instance, China is constructing a vast navy, to the point where it has alarmed the entire world, especially those nations nearby like India or Japan, due to the ongoing dread of the international order's rules being challenged and disturbed. The field of maritime security is becoming increasingly sophisticated throughout the world in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The most important infrastructure in the maritime domain is the islands, artificial or natural ones. Coco Islands is one such island which is located to the north east of the Bay of Bengal. They belong to the Yangon region of Myanmar. The islands are 414 kilometers (257 miles) south of Yangon. There are five islands in the Coco Island group: four are on the Great Coco Reef and one is on the Little Coco Reef. Preparis Island, which is a part of Myanmar, located to the north of this collection of islands. Landfall Island, which belongs to India, is located to the south.

These islands have historically been a part of the British Crown's Indian Ocean Islands. The Coco Islands joined Burmese territory after S12 bhumi split from India in 1937, although the remainder of the Andaman and Nicobar islands remained under the control of the Indian British Empire. Due to their strategic and vital importance, the Japanese took control of them during World War II.

Despite being close to one of the busiest maritime chokepoints on Earth, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are some of the world's most neglected maritime terrain. When talking about global geopolitics and trade, the Strait of Malacca dominates the conversation. The importance of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia as littoral states is well known to all observers. India basically serves as a fourth littoral state because it owns the ANI, but far too few people are aware of this. India now has the power to control traffic in the Strait of Malacca thanks to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It is located around 1,078 kilometers to the northwest of the strait's western exit.

The US 7th fleet, an aircraft carrier commanded by the USS Enterprise, was sent into the Bay of Bengal exactly 45 years ago in December 1971 by the United States to stop India from engulfing Pakistan. It has since become one of the most influential and fascinating players in the Indo Pacific. The United States would considerably strengthen its power in the ongoing strategic battle with China if it could take use of its growing strategic cooperation with India and the use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Surprisingly, no state has utilized the geopolitical placement of the Islands in the modern period.  The islands, though they are a part of Indian territory, would be most useful in a scenario where a sizable coalition was protecting the maritime commons. The Indo-Pacific's growing strategic struggle will pique everyone's interest in the archipelagoes. The Strait of Malacca may effectively be under the hands of whoever holds control of the Islands, giving them a significant tactical advantage in any future maritime conflicts.  The Strait of Malacca may effectively be under the hands of whoever holds control of the ANI, giving them a significant tactical advantage in any future maritime conflicts.   

In order to confront a growing maritime threat from China, the US must figure out a way to make use of the strategic advantages of the islands. It is possible to exploit strategic gains by taking part in bilateral security and diplomatic initiatives that also encourage enhanced military cooperation between the United States and India. Even the perception of India and the United States working together might be a powerful strategic deterrent to future rivals like China.

The Great Coco Island has long been the focus of rumours of conspiracies, but now there may be good reason to be concerned about it. The Bay of Bengal's Coco Islands, which belong to Myanmar, have long been the focus of geopolitical intrigue. The most frequent charge is that Myanmar has permitted a Chinese signals intelligence facility on the archipelago since the early 1990s. The most significant Chinese electronic intelligence post in Myanmar [Burma] is the marine reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal, some 300 km south of the Burmese peninsula. North of India's Andaman Islands, in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea, the Chinese Army is also constructing a facility on Small Coco Island.

Prior to the most recent construction, the Coco Islands had a sizable amount of land reclamation in 2017, which resulted in the enlargement of the Coco Island airstrip from 1,300 meters to 2,300 meters, with the option of going even farther to 2,500 meters.  On the Coco Islands in Myanmar, which are 55 kilometers north of India's tri-service base at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, there is evidence that the country's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are being bolstered. Controlled by Myanmar, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is helping to build the Coco Islands base, which is accessible to Chinese military troops, particularly technical staff from the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).

Due to Myanmar's international isolation, Beijing and Naypidaw have a very strong bilateral relationship. In exchange for weapons, facilities for the production of arms, and new military gear, Naypidaw offers shore and off-shore facilities for the establishment of Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) facilities. In addition to the Great Coco Island, Chinese SIGINT facilities have also been established on the Ramree Island off the coast of Arakan, the Hangyii Island facility at the mouth of the Irrawaddy Delta, at Monkey Point in Rangoon, and on the island of Zadetkyi Kyun on the Kra Peninsula. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese have maintained a sizable tri-service base in Irrawaddy.

The contemporary geostrategic significance is still very important. The issue arises when it is supposedly stated in some sources that China has leased several of the Coco group's islands and that Chinese military are constructing bases and other infrastructures around it.

The Indian Navy, as well as other vital strategic facilities and the movements of Indian forces in the eastern Indian Ocean, can all be observed from these islands, which is a major reason for concern for India. This may be the case given that the Mekong Lankan Cooperation group just met under the chairmanship of China, with the new military dictatorship in power in Myanmar, which is currently isolated globally and in desperate need of aid, in attendance. The Chinese Blue Water Navy can manifest itself thanks to the existence of the Coco Islands. China intends to encircle India using the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and Bay of Bengal. Another issue is that Beijing would gain a significant regional edge over New Delhi if China increased its pressure on the Tatmadaw (military junta) by using naval intelligence obtained from surveillance flights from Great Coco for much-needed economic investment.

The Andaman and Nicobar islands are a very crucial piece of real estate since they are situated on significant water routes in the Indian Ocean and are home to the only tri-service command of the Indian military. The Andaman and Nicobar islands, as stated, "Provide strategic depth in the Bay of Bengal and command approaches to the Strait of Malacca for India's Eastern Fleet." Great Coco Island has long been thought of as a prime location for spying on Indian military activity because it is only 55 kilometers north of Andaman & Nicobar Island. A somewhat "non-existent Chinese intelligence post, the Bay of Bengal may soon have to contend with an airbase hosting Myanmar's air force," according to rising development activity on the island. While Myanmar is not a strategic threat to India, the Junta's isolation from China and reliance on it for its economic survival may make it susceptible to pressure from Beijing.

With these recent developments in the Coco Islands, the People’s Republic of China has stepped up its Indian Ocean policy. Finding out China's intentions would be a perilous and challenging task, but under Xi Jinping, Beijing has demonstrated a predilection for taking risks along with a rising self-perception that its capabilities allow the Chinese military opportunity to test and probe the redlines of opponents.

The PRC's most recent build-up in cooperation with Naypidaw only strengthens the PRC's minatory military presence in close proximity to a crucial Indian military base on the island of Andaman and Nicobar that houses all three of India's armed services under a single unified command. Chinese troops are already stationed on Indian-claimed territory. The development of further Chinese military facilities on the Coco Islands demonstrates Beijing's military aspirations go far beyond its territorial claims in the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Taiwan.

Regardless of China's intentions, it is now abundantly clear that Beijing sees a chance to limit India's maritime responses in the event of a war by projecting its military might through the development of infrastructure and intelligence gathering. In order to convince the military junta that Myanmar's Coco Island territory, or for that matter any other part of Myanmar's territory, cannot be used to stage and carry out military operations by the Chinese against Indian territory and against Indian off-shore and on-shore military base facilities, New Delhi must intensify its pressure on Naypidaw.

The Coco Islands' function as a SIGINT gathering station that has undergone significant enhancement with Chinese aid would provide issues for India's tri-service command at the Andaman and Nicobar even if it does not act as a staging ground for Chinese naval, aviation, or amphibious missions against India. In order to strengthen its defences against the Chinese military, New Delhi will need to assess the effectiveness of the current capabilities at the Andaman and Nicobar.

Even if it doesn't serve as a staging area for Chinese naval, air, or amphibious missions against India, the Coco Islands' role as a SIGINT gathering site that has undergone significant upgrading with Chinese assistance would present problems for India's tri-service command at the Andaman and Nicobar. New Delhi needs to evaluate how well the A&N's current capabilities are working in order to bolster its defences against the Chinese military.

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https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125744/444375_The%20complexity%20of%20the%20maritime%20realm%20in%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf

https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-13-no-2/Neglected-Maritime-Terrain-in-the-Bay-of-Bengal/

https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/2402381-militarisation-of-coco-island-concern-for-india

https://thewire.in/security/construction-on-myanmars-coco-island-raises-concerns-over-indias-security-report

Myanmar's Coco Island : Maritime Security Concern for India

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